













































A rapidly emerging literature on the aggregate labor market focuses on the ‡ows of
workers across establishments and through labor market states in order to better understand
the behavior of aggregate employment and unemployment.1 A major motivation for this
focus is the realization that many labor market policies are best understood through their
impact on the underlying labor market ‡ows. Obvious examples include dismissal costs
and unemployment insurance.2 Recent advances in measuring the ‡ows of workers across
establishments are important factors assisting this modeling e¤ort, thereby imposing more
discipline on the model-building exercise.3
One structure that has been used extensively to study labor market ‡ows is that of
matching models. The Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) matching model is arguably the proto-
typical model from this class of matching models. They build a model in which idiosyncratic
shocks to job matches create an incentive for match destruction and creation. This real-
location of employment across matches is mediated by a matching function, requires time
and resources, and is stochastic from the individual’s perspective. They show analytically
that their model is qualitatively consistent with some of the empirical regularities that are
displayed by job creation and job destruction over the business cycle.
In this paper, we examine in greater detail whether the Mortensen-Pissarides matching
model can account for the business cycle facts on employment, job creation, and job destruc-
tion. Although matching models have been used rather extensively recently, there has been
little systematic work to evaluate their quantitative properties with regard to labor market
‡ows over the business cycle.4 One recent counterexample is o¤ered by Merz (1996). She
tries to account for the ‡ow into and out of unemployment over the business cycle, rather
than job creation and job destruction. A feature that distinguishes her analysis from that of
1Examples include Pissarides (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Bertola and Ichino (1995), Green-
wood, MacDonald and Zhang (1996), Merz (1996) and Caballero and Hammour (1996).
2Recent examples of policy evaluation include Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993), Millard and Mortensen (1995), and Bertola and Rogerson (1997).
3Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1987), Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Blanchard and Diamond (1990)
are examples of papers which document these ‡ows.
4The reader familiar with the Mortensen-Pissarides article is aware that they report some success in
matching business cycle facts for a simulated version of their model. As we show in Section 5, this success
does not persist if one considers a larger set of facts.ours and Mortensen and Pissarides is her assumption that all (endogenous) separations are
temporary rather than permanent.
A novel feature of our analysis is its emphasis on the equilibrium reduced-form implica-
tions of the Mortensen-Pissarides model. We argue that our representation of the equilibrium
process implied by the structural model provides a convenient way to both assess the model’s
ability to account for the data and to uncover the role of various factors in generating speci…c
results. For example, we show analytically that the speed with which employment responds
following an aggregate shock is an important determinant of the model’s ability to match
the business cycle facts. An additional advantage of the reduced-form approach is that it is
robust to several extensions and/or variations to the structural model.
The main …nding of our analysis is that the reduced form implied by the Mortensen-
Pissarides model can account quite well for the business cycle facts. A key quali…cation,
however, is that the extent to which the model matches the business cycle facts is very
dependent upon the steady state about which the model ‡uctuates. In this regard, the
average hazard rate for escape from unemployment to employment is a key parameter. We
…nd that an escape rate on the order of one-third for a quarterly model is required. We
argue that a hazard of this magnitude in a representative agent model is consistent with
the data, if one considers individuals who are recorded as out of the labor force, but who
want a job, to be (low intensity) searchers. This view is consistent with the assumptions
Blanchard and Diamond (1989,1990) use in their empirical analyses of labor market ‡ows.
This …nding suggests that incorporating heterogeneity in worker search e¤ort may be an
important theoretical extension to the framework. Our …nding is consistent with that of
Caballero and Hammour (1996). They argue in a similar model that one way to obtain a
negative correlation between job creation and job destruction is to diminish the importance
of the unemployment stock as an incentive for entrepreneurs to create jobs. In our model,
this is accomplished by having a high average value of unemployment, which is achieved by
a low hazard rate.
The outline of the paper follows. In the next section, we document the business
cycle facts for employment, job creation, and job destruction. In Section 3, we describe
the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model and explain our reduced-form approach. Section
24 develops some analytic results that help articulate key tradeo¤s in matching the model
with the data. Section 5 presents our quantitative results. Section 6 discusses the issue of
calibrating steady-state values. Section 7 concludes.
2. Business Cycle Facts For Employment, Job Creation, and Job
Destruction
In this section, we document the cyclical properties of employment, job creation, and
job destruction. As is standard in business cycle studies, we use observations at the quar-
terly frequency. It is widely regarded that the highest quality data on job creation and job
destruction is based on the LRD data …rst used by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and is
documented recently in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). This data only covers the
manufacturing sector for the period 1972:2-1988:4. This dictates the scope and time frame of
our empirical analysis. Our employment measure is the Citibase series for workers on man-
ufacturing payrolls. Since job creation and job destruction series are based on employment
information gathered in February, May, August, and November, we use employment …gures
for these same months.
We adopt the de…nitions for job creation and job destruction used in Davis, Halti-
wanger, and Schuh (1996). Job creation in period t (Ct) is the sum of all net employment
gains at establishments experiencing positive net employment gains between t ¡ 1 and t.
Job destruction in period t (Dt) is the sum of all net employment losses at establishments
experiencing negative net employment gains between t ¡ 1 and t. The employment measure
on which these statistics are based is also workers on manufacturing payrolls. Literally, job
creation measures net additions to payrolls at establishments experiencing increases in the
size of their payrolls between two points in time.
The three series we study are linked by the identity
Et ¡ Et¡1 = Ct ¡ Dt; (1)
where Et is employment at period t. If, as in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), the rates
of job creation and job destruction, denoted by CRt and DRt; respectively, are obtained by
expressing the creation and job destruction measures as fractions relative to the mean of
current and lagged employment, then dividing both sides of (1) by the mean of current and
3lagged employment produces an equivalent identity
Et ¡ Et¡1
:5(Et¡1 + Et)
= CRt ¡ DRt: (2)
Equation (2) which basically says that the growth rate in employment between periods t¡1
and t is equal to the di¤erence between the job creation rate and the job destruction rate.
For reasons of symmetry, it seems preferable to either work with all series in levels or with
all series in rates. Following most business cycle studies, we report results for the case using
data in levels.5
We document the cyclical properties of these series following the standard practice in
the business cycle literature. The cyclical component of a series is de…ned to be the deviations
from a trend and is obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott …lter to data which has been
seasonally adjusted and logged. (See Cooley (1995) for details on this procedure.) In our
quantitative work, we apply the same detrending procedure to the data that is generated by
the model. As a practical matter, we found that our summary statistics are little a¤ected
by simply using the logged data in place of the deviations from the trend. Moreover, if we
use the seasonally unadjusted data, the facts that are central to our analysis are essentially
the same. While in this particular case the choice of procedure does not seem to matter that
much, some choice must be made in order to present the business cycle facts, so we follow
the common practice of basing our facts on data that is seasonally adjusted and …ltered.6
Table 1 presents several summary statistics. Note that since each series is logged prior
to detrending, deviations correspond to percent deviations.
5We repeated our analysis based on the series in growth rate form and found that it did not a¤ect our
conclusions.
6Seasonally unadjusted series for CRt and DRt were obtained from the Census. We construct series for Ct
and Dt using the appropriate seasonally unadjusted manufacturing employment data from the establishment
survey and then seasonally adjust the three series (Ct; Dt; and Et) using the Census X11 seasonal adjustment
routine for quarterly data.
4Table 1
Summary Statistics 1972:2-1988:4
(data is seasonally adjusted and HP …ltered)
1a. Standard Deviations and Autocorrelations
standard deviation autocorrelation
Employment .030 .90
Job Creation .117 .51
Job Destruction .197 .65
1b. Contemporaneous Correlations
Employment Job Creation Job Destruction
Employment 1.00 -.01 -.23
Job Creation -.01 1.00 -.65
Job Destruction -.23 -.65 1.00
1c. Correlations With Employment at Leads and Lags
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Job Creation at t -.41 -.61 -.63 -.03 .22 .36 .45
Job Destruction at t .13 .43 .58 -.26 -.52 -.62 -.63
Rather than walking the reader through the previous tables, we close this section with
a summary list of the facts that are used in the subsequent analysis:7
² Volatility: Job creation is roughly four times as volatile as employment, and job
destruction is more than six times as volatile.
² Persistence: All three series display strong positive autocorrelation, but the au-
tocorrelation for employment, which is .9, is nearly twice that for the other two
series.
² Contemporaneous Correlations: Job creation and job destruction have a fairly
large negative correlation. Destruction is (weakly) negatively correlated with em-
ployment, whereas creation is virtually uncorrelated with employment.
7Using data for Michigan, Foote (1996) found that the standard deviation of the job creation rate exceeded
that of the job destruction rate in some industries. He does not report the coe¢cient of variation, so it is not
clear that this …nding is necessarily counter to the one we report here. He also …nds a negative correlation
between job creation and job destruction.
5² Dynamics: Job creation is negatively correlated with lagged employment and pos-
itively correlated with future employment. The opposite pattern holds for job
destruction.
3. The Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Model
In thissection, welay out the Mortensen-Pissarides(MP) matching model and examine
the reduced-form process for employment, job creation, and job destruction implied by the
model’s equilibrium. We proceed in two steps. First, we motivate our reduced-form structure
in the context of a simple version of this model. Second, we consider an extension of this
model that more closely resembles the one in the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching
model.
A. Basic Model
There is a continuum of identical workers with total mass equal to one. Each worker




t(ct ¡ ant); (3)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 is a discount factor, ct is consumption, and nt is time spent working.
Consumption is restricted to be nonnegative, and time spent working is restricted to be
either zero or one. The parameter a measures the disutility associated with working and is
assumed to be positive.
There is also a continuum of identical agents whom we refer to as entrepreneurs, each





where ¯ and ct are as above. For reasons that will become clear shortly, we assume that each
entrepreneur is endowed with ¹ c units of the consumption good in every period.
There are two technologies in this economy, one that describes the production of
output by a matched worker-entrepreneur pair, and another that describes the process by
which workers and entrepreneurs become matched. We begin with the former. A matched
pair produces output sty; if it is productive and 0 otherwise. The variable st is an aggregate
6technology shock assumed for simplicity to follow a symmetric two-state Markov chain in
which Á (= Á11 = Á22) is the probability of remaining in the same state for two consecutive
periods. We assume that s1 > s2; and we refer to s1 as the good state and s2 as the bad
state.8
In addition to the aggregate shock, each matched pair faces an idiosyncratic shock
which determines whether the pair remains productive. The probability of such a realization
is the same for all matches currently producing, but realizations are independent across
matches. The probability that a match which produced output in period t ¡ 1 will become
unproductive in period t is given by ¸t and is realized at the beginning of period t. The
variable ¸t also follows a two-state Markov chain and is perfectly correlated with the aggregate
technology shock. Hence, when s takes on the value sj, ¸ is assumed to take on the value ¸j.
We assume that ¸1 < ¸2, so that the probability of a match becoming unproductive is greater
during bad times. Once a match becomes unproductive, it remains in this state forever.
The distinguishing feature between an entrepreneur and a worker is that entrepreneurs
have the ability to create job vacancies. We assume that this can be done costlessly. To
produce output, however, the job vacancy must be matched with a worker, and the process
of …nding such a match does require time and resources. In particular, it costs an entrepreneur
k units of consumption to post a vacancy.9 We assume that unmatched workers can search
costlessly, whereas matched workers are assumed to be unable to search; i.e., there is no
on-the-job search.10
We next turn to the matching function. If, in a given period, there are v vacancies
posted and u unmatched workers searching, the number of matches formed between entre-
preneurs and workers is given by the matching function m(v;u): The probability that a given
8The variable st refers to the value of s in period t, which may be either s1 or s2. While this notation is
obviously abusive, we think the potential confusion is minimal.
9Alternatively, one can assume that there is an initial cost k1 to create a vacant position and a cost of k2
each period in which it is posted. If, in equilibrium, there are always new vacancies created, then the two
speci…cations have identical implications for employment, job creation, and job destruction if k = k1 + k2:
However, in a calibration exercise the two spec…cations would presumably suggest di¤erent outcomes, since
k and k1 are presumably the same.
10Pissarides (1994) extends the matching model to allow for an on-the-job search.










We assume that the matching function m is nonnegative, increasing in both arguments,
concave, less than the minimum of its arguments, and displays constant returns to scale.
Constant returns to scale implies that p and q are functions only of the ratio v=u.
Any matches that result from search in period t become productive as of period t+1.
Hence, the law of motion for ut is given by
ut+1 = ¸t+1(1 ¡ ut) + ut ¡ m(vt;ut): (7)
Note that a worker who was part of a match that dissolves in the beginning of period t is
assumed to search in period t:11
The last item that needs to be described is the determination of wages. In this envi-
ronment, a matched worker-…rm pair constitutes a bilateral monopoly. As is standard in this
literature, we use a generalized Nash bargaining solution in which the worker’s threat point
is equal to the value of being unemployed, and the entrepreneur’s threat point is the value of
an unmatched vacancy (which is zero in equilibrium).
We next de…ne a recursive equilibrium for this economy, but before doing so, we must
introduce some notation. The aggregate state variable in each period is given by the pair
(j;u), where j indexes the aggregate shock, and u is the mass of workers who are searching.
There are three value functions of interest representing the utilities of matched entrepreneurs,
matched workers, and unmatched workers, denoted by Jj(u), Wj(u), and Uj(u); respectively.
Agents take wages and matching probabilities parametrically, since these values depend on
the aggregate state. We let qj(u) and pj(u) be the probabilities that searching entrepreneurs
and workers …nd a match, respectively, and let wj(u) be the wage payment to a matched
11Note also that we have assumed that a match resulting from search in period t is necessarily productive
in period t + 1: This assumption is not signi…cant quantitatively, but it does simplify the analytics. If newly
created jobs were subject to becoming unproductive, then job creation and job destruction in period t + 1
would be functions both of the search e¤orts in period t and the shock realization in period t + 1:
8worker when the aggregate state is (j;u): The evolution of the aggregate state is described
by the function Tj(u); where for each (j;u); this function speci…es a distribution over next
period’s value of the state variable.
A recursive equilibrium is then a list of functions Jj(u), Wj(u), Uj(u); qj(u); pj(u);
wj(u); and Tj(u) such that
1: (Optimization) Taking the functions qj; pj; and wj as given, Jj, Wj, and Uj
satisfy the appropriate Bellman equations.
2: (Free Entry) ¯qj(u)EjJj0(u0) = k for all (j;u); where (j0;u0) is next period’s
value for the aggregate state variable.
3: (Bargaining) Wj(u) ¡ Uj(u) = µ[Wj(u) + Jj(u) ¡ Uj(u)]:
4. (Rational Expectations) For each (j;u); decisions generate a distribution
over next period’s state which is equal to the distribution given by Tj(u):
It is standard in the related literature to study equilibria in which wages depend only
upon the aggregate technology shock and not on the level of unemployment.12 To see why
such an equilibrium may exist, assume that wj is the wage rate if the aggregate shock takes
on value j. In this case, the value to an entrepreneur of a currently productive match when
the aggregate technology shock is j satis…es





i); j = 1;2; (8)
where u0
i is next period’s unemployment rate conditional on shock i being realized: Given
wages, one can easily solve this set of equations for values of Jj that do not depend upon
the level of unemployment, since it reduces to a set of two linear equations in two unknowns.





implies that (in equilibrium) the qj do not depend on u, and by constant returns to scale of
m, neither do the pj:
12While it is straightforward to show that such an equilibrium exists, we have not been able to rule out the
possibility that equilibria which do not satisfy this property may also exist. We also note that it is easy to
show that optimal allocations have the property that q and p do not depend on the level of unemployment.
9The two value functions for workers are
Wj(u) = wj ¡ a + ¯
2 X
i=1




i)]; j = 1;2; (10)















; j = 1;2 (11)
for an unmatched worker, where we have again used u0
i to represent next period’s unemploy-
ment rate conditional upon the realization of the shock being i. Since the pj do not depend
on u; these equations have solutions for Wj and Uj that also do not depend on u:
Finally, note that the above argument is consistent in the sense that if none of the
value functions depend on u; then condition (3) of equilibrium implies that wages do not
depend on u: While the argument supplied above implies only that it is logically consistent
to look for an equilibrium of this type, it does not guarantee existence of an equilibrium.
It is, however, straightforward to show that an equilibrium will exist under relatively mild
assumptions.
Although the value functions and parametric functions (i.e., w; p; and q) do not depend
on u; it does not follow that the level of u in a particular period does not a¤ect outcomes
in that period. For example, since qj does not depend on u; it follows that the number of
vacancies posted is a function of u: Additionally, given that pj does not depend on u; it follows
that holding the value of the aggregate shock constant, the number of workers who …nd jobs
is increasing in the level of unemployment.
Assuming that the aggregate shocks are persistent, i.e., that Á = Á11 = Á22 > :5, it is
straightforward to show that J;W;U;w; and p are all greater when j = 1 than when j = 2;
and conversely for q. Most of these results should appear intuitive; the only ones on which we
remark are the behavior of q and p. Note …rst that constant returns to scale in the matching
function, m, implies that q and p must move in opposite directions. Second, if the value of
a match to an entrepreneur is greater in good times than in bad, it follows from equation
(9) that q is necessarily decreasing in j since, in equilibrium, vacancies are posted up to the
point that the return to posting a vacancy is driven to zero. Because the value of a match is
greater in good times, it must be that the probability that an entrepreneur …nds a match is
lower.
10B. Reduced-Form Labor Market Dynamics
One of the attractive features of this model is that a relatively small set of parameters
are su¢cient to completely characterize its implications for the time series in which we are
interested. In particular, it su¢ces to know the values of the ¸j, the pj, and Á. Given an
initial unemployment rate and any realization of aggregate shocks, repeated application of
equation (7) in conjunction with m(vt;ut) = ptut¡1 allows one to solve for the time series of
employment, job creation, and job destruction:
et+1 = (1 ¡ ¸t+1)et + pt(1 ¡ et) (12)
Ct = pt¡1(1 ¡ et¡1) (13)
Dt = ¸tet: (14)
Of course, the pj’s are themselves functions of all of the model’s structural parameters.
One way to proceed would be to solve for this mapping and determine whether one can …nd
a reasonable set of structural parameters of the model such that it can account for the facts
displayed in Section 2. Here, however, we pursue the alternative strategy of treating the
reduced-form parameterization (i.e., ¸1; ¸2; p1; p2 and Á) as the primitive and examine the
extent to which this reduced form can account for the cyclical facts documented earlier.
There are three reasons for pursuing this alternative. First, the reduced form is a very
parsimonious representation of the model’s implications and hence facilitates exposition of
the mechanics of the model. Second, studying the reduced form dramatically reduces the
dimensionality of the space that one searches over to assess the model’s ability to capture a
certain set of facts. Third, there are several reasonable extensions to the above model which
would yield the same reduced form but change the mapping from structural parameters to
the pj’s. Here we brie‡y mention three. In the …rst case, assume that there is a choice of
e¤ort and/or hours in each productive match. This would require additional functional form
assumptions and parameter values to describe preferences over hours and/or work e¤ort and
the implications for output of changes along these two margins. However, independently
of how these features are introduced, it is relatively straightforward to see that a reduced
form identical to that considered above would still result. In the second case, assume that
11workers who are unemployed make a decision about search intensity. This would also require
additional functional form assumptions and parameter value assignments, but assuming that
the matching function still displays constant returns to scale, the reduced form would remain
unchanged. Lastly, one could imagine other ways of resolving the bargaining problem which
would leave the reduced form unchanged but alter the structural mapping.
The above discussion also serves to illustrate why we chose to focus only on a subset
of the variables for which the model makes predictions. For example, we do not study the
model’s implications for productivity movements. The reason is that productivity movements
are not robust to the kinds of changes discussed in the previous paragraph. Hence, the issue
of whether the matching model can account for productivity movements in conjunction with
those in employment, job creation, and job destruction would seem to be more an exercise
of investigating the role of alternative speci…cations within this general class of models. We
leave this for future work.
Before considering a more general model, we note that it is straightforward to …nd a
speci…cation of this model so as to obtain any reduced form with p1 > p2: To see this, note
that with constant returns to scale, determining the pj’s is equivalent to determining the qj’s.







¯q1(Á11J1 + Á12J2) = k: (16)
If, for example, we set µ = 0; then it follows that w1 = w2 = a; and the Jj are easily
determined by the values of the yj; ¸j, and Áij: Moreover, any ratio of J1
J2 greater than one
can be obtained by adjusting the values of the yj’s. Equation (16) can then be used to
determine the value of k; for example, consistent with the value of q1: A related issue of
interest is whether any reduced form can be obtained as an e¢cient equilibrium for some
speci…cation of the economy. The parameterization given above would typically result in an
equilibrium which is not e¢cient. If, for example, the matching function is given by av1¡´u´,
then equilibrium is e¢cient if and only if µ = ´: (See Hosios (1990) for a discussion related to
this point.) While we have not established a result connecting our reduced form to structural
speci…cations for which the equilibrium is e¢cient, we note that the added restriction is not
12obviously an issue, since all that is required is enough freedom to achieve any value for the
ratio of J2 to J1:
C. Extension of the Basic Model
In the model described above, aggregate shocks a¤ect both the productivity of a match
and the probability that the match is destroyed. One innovation of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) is to endogenize the job destruction decision. In this subsection, we extend the basic
model to incorporatethis decision. Productivity of amatch isnow thesumof twocomponents:
an aggregate (or common) component y and an idiosyncratic component denoted by ²: Each
new match starts with an idiosyncratic productivity equal to ²u; which subsequently evolves
stochastically.13 The stochastic process describing this evolution is the same for all matches,
although realizations are independent across matches. For reasons of analytical tractability,
it is assumed to take the following special form. In each period, with probability °, a given
match receives a new value for its idiosyncratic component. If it does receive a new draw, it
is a random draw from a distribution with cdf F(²); which has support on [²l;²u]; where ²l
< ²u: Note that conditional upon receiving a new draw, the previous value of ² is irrelevant.
The process does display positive persistence, since this period’s idiosyncratic component is
the same as last period’s in the absence of a new draw.
The assumption about timing is that at the beginning of a period, each match which
is produced in the previous period receives its current realization for the idiosyncratic shock.
(All new matches have idiosyncratic component ²u:) Subsequently, everyone observes the
realization of the aggregate shock, at which point all matched pairs decide whether to continue
or separate, and search decisions are made.
Describing an equilibrium is now slightly more complicated. First, relative to the pre-
vious model, there is an additional decision of whether to destroy existing matches; i.e., there
is no longer an exogenous variable ¸ that describes separations. It is straightforward to show,
however, that the optimal destruction decision is characterized by a reservation productivity
level, which we denote by ¹ ². This reservation value is dependent on the aggregate technology
13What matters for our reduced form is simply that the starting productivity is su¢ciently high to warant
forming a match for at least one period. Subject to this being true, there is no problem if the stating values
for new matches are drawn from a distribution.
13shock, and it can be shown that ¹ ²1 < ¹ ²2; i.e., during bad times a higher idiosyncratic com-
ponent is required to stay in business. Second, the aggregate state variable is now of greater
dimensionality. Whereas previously, the aggregate state variable was the aggregate shock and
the mass of employed (or equivalently, unemployed) workers, it is now the aggregate shock
and the distribution of matches across idiosyncratic productivities. We denote the latter by
a measure ¹: Note that one can infer the unemployment rate from the measure ¹:
However, the stochastic process on idiosyncratic shocks does simplify the model’s
mechanics. If the aggregate shock assumes value j for two consecutive periods, the fraction
of matches that are destroyed is given by ¸j = °F(¹ ²j); i.e., the fraction of matches which
both receive a new draw and obtain a new value of ² that lies below the reservation value.
In particular, this value does not depend on the distribution ¹: If the aggregate shock goes
from the low productivity state to the high productivity state, the fraction of jobs destroyed
is still given by ¸1: If, however, the economy moves from the high productivity state to the
low productivity state, the fraction of matches destroyed exceeds ¸2; because all matches that
did not receive new draws but have an idiosyncratic component ² that satis…es ¹ ²1< ² < ¹ ²2
will also be destroyed. The mass of these matches is given by (1 ¡ °)
R ²2
²1 ¹(²)d²:
It should be clear that the reduced-form dynamics of this model for employment, job
creation, and job destruction are identical to those of the basic model discussed earlier, with
the exception of those periods in which the economy moves from a good state to a bad state.
The extent of this di¤erence depends on the distribution of matches ¹ at the time of the
change and hence is not constant over time. Note, however, that holding the aggregate shock
constant, the measure ¹ will converge to some measure ¹j depending on j: From a practical
perspective, if the aggregate shocks are fairly persistent, then this additional destruction may
be reasonably well approximated by the term ¸0 = (1¡°)
R ²2
²1 ¹1(²)d²; which is constant over
time. With this approximation, the implications of the extended model for employment, job
creation, and job destruction are completely speci…ed by the six numbers Á; ¸0; ¸1; ¸2; p1;
and p2; so that the only di¤erence between this model and the basic model is the additional
parameter ¸0: In what follows, we will use this approximation as our reduced form.14
14One way to judge the merits of this approximation is to apply it to the numerical example in Mortensen-
Pissarides (1994). When we did this, we found that the summary statistics on which we focus were very
144. Cyclical Behavior of Creation and Destruction: Analytic Results
In this section, we explore analytically the model’s implications for the response of
job creation and job destruction to a change in the aggregate shock. For simplicity, we focus
on the reduced form of the basic model, i.e., the case in which ¸0 = 0; but our results do
not depend upon this restriction. Note …rst that if the aggregate shock takes on the same
value repeatedly, the economy converges to a state in which unemployment is constant. In
particular, assuming a long sequence of realizations of aggregate shock j, the unemployment





from which it follows that ^ u1 < ^ u2: We call ^ u1 and ^ u2 conditional steady states, to indicate
that they are states which reproduce themselves conditional on the realization of the aggregate
shock. Moreover, starting from any initial unemployment rate, if the aggregate shock remains
unchanged for many periods, unemployment converges monotonically to the level ^ uj as long
as pj + ¸j is less than one, a condition which is strongly supported by the data.
Our main interest here is in the cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction,
de…ned by
Ct = pt¡1ut¡1 (18)
Dt = ¸t(1 ¡ ut): (19)
If unemployment is not changing over time, then job creation must equal job destruction.
As a theoretical matter, it is possible for either of the two conditional steady states to have
the higher level of job creation and job destruction, since there are o¤setting e¤ects (i.e., p
and u move in opposite directions across conditional steady states, as do ¸ and (1 ¡ u)). As
a practical matter, it is reasonable to assume that the high-employment conditional steady
state is associated with lower levels of job creation and job destruction. (This corresponds to
the observation in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) that total job reallocation is countercyclical.)
To make the discussion more concrete, assume that the economy is in the good state
and unemployment is ^ u1 when the economy experiences a shift from the good state to the bad
similar.
15state, where it stays for many periods. Figure 1 shows the response of job creation and job
destruction. The increase in ¸ causes job destruction to increase initially, but this is followed
by a monotonic decline as employment moves monotonically to its new lower conditional
steady state.
Job creation is initially unchanged, since the change in the technology shock does not
a¤ect last period’s hiring. Subsequently, however, there are o¤setting e¤ects on job creation.
On the one hand, the probability that an unemployed worker …nds a job is lower, tending to
make job creation decrease. On the other hand, the level of unemployment is monotonically
increasing, tending to make job creation increase. Because job creation and job destruction
will eventually be equal (we are assuming no further changes in the aggregate shock), the
latter e¤ect must eventually dominate. However, the former e¤ect may dominate early on,
as it does in Figure 1, since this is when unemployment is lowest.
Obviously, it is somewhat of an empirical issue as to whether this dynamic response
produces a positive or negative correlation between job creation and job destruction. The
above analysis predicts that there is at least one period following the shock in which job
creation is below average and job destruction is above average, but not necessarily more than
one.15 The next section is devoted to an examination of the quantitative predictions of the
model. It is of interest, however, to provide some intuition for the circumstances under which
it is more likely that a negative correlation will obtain.
The previous discussion suggests two mechanisms through which the model may pro-
duce a negative value for this correlation. One is relatively frequent changes in the aggregate
technology shock, since the initial e¤ect of a switch in the aggregate technology shock is to
produce a negative correlation.16 The other is slow adjustment of employment to its condi-
tional steady-state value, since the closer employment is to its conditional steady state the
more likely it is that job creation and job destruction are in the same position relative to
their average values.
15Caballero and Hammour (1996) note that the importance of this initial period obviously diminishes as the
time period is shortened. As our analysis indicates, however, it does not follow that creation and destruction
are necessarily positively correlated.
16More speci…cally, changes in the aggregate shock from above average to below average or vice versa are
what matter. Hence, there is no strong reason to suspect that having more values for the aggregate shock
would improve the model’s ability to account for the data.
16In the model, it is clear how to bring about more frequent aggregate shocks—this is
caused exclusively by a decrease in Á: At the same time, however, it is to be expected that
there is a strong tension associated with moving in this direction: in the data, employment
is strongly autocorrelated, and increasing the frequency of shocks is expected to decrease the
persistence in employment. What a¤ects the rate of convergence to a conditional steady state
in the model may be less transparent. We discuss two channels here. The …rst concerns the
average levels about which the economy ‡uctuates, and the second has to do with the relative
importance of shocks to ¸ and p:
We begin by rewriting equation (12) as
ut+1 ¡ ut = ¸ ¡ (¸ + p)ut; (20)
which can be rearranged to yield
ut+1 = ut + (¸ + p)(^ u ¡ ut); (21)
where ^ u is the conditional steady-state unemployment rate associated with the values of ¸
and p: Equation (21) says that the rate at which unemployment converges to its conditional
steady state is equal to ¸ + p: An implication of this is that lower average values of ¸ and
p should lower the correlation between job creation and job destruction. As we shall see
empirically, the average value of p is much greater than the average value of ¸; so that the
speed of convergence is largely dictated by p:
To motivate thesecond channel, we ask thequestion: Holding the change in conditional
steady-state unemployment constant, does the extent to which the increased unemployment
is caused by changes in p versus changes in ¸ matter for the correlation between C and D? To
answer this, recall our earlier discussion of the dynamics following a change in the aggregate
shock. The e¤ect which pushes creation in the opposite direction to the change in destruction
is due to the decrease in p: After the initial period, there are opposing e¤ects at work on job
creation. On the one hand, the increased unemployment brought about by the increase in
¸ causes job creation to increase. On the other hand, the decrease in p causes job creation
to decrease. This suggests that the greater the change in p relative to ¸; the greater is the
likelihood that the second e¤ect dominates, at least for some amount of time. (Recall that
the …rst e¤ect must eventually dominate.) The extent to which this e¤ect is useful, however,
17may be limited by the fact that in the data, job destruction is more volatile than job creation,
suggesting that there may be limits on the volatility of p relative to ¸.
5. Results
A. Mortensen-Pissarides’ Numerical Example
As mentioned in the introduction, readers familiar with the Mortensen-Pissarides
(1994) paper may be under the impression that we are attacking a solved problem, since
that paper contains a numerical example with reasonable parameter values that mimics
fairly well some business cycle facts for the rates of job creation and job destruction. It
turns out, however, that while their example does well along some dimensions, its does not
do so well on others. In fact, it is these problems along other dimensions that motivate our
analysis. Therefore it seems worthwhile to begin by reporting the larger set of statistics for
the Mortensen-Pissarides example. We emphasize that their numerical example does not
claim nor even necessarily intend to capture a larger set of cyclical facts than they report
in their article. One interpretation of our work is an attempt to extend the success of the
Mortensen-Pissarides example to a larger set of cyclical facts.
Table 2 provides the same information for the MP model as Table 1 did for the data.17
To obtain these statistics, we simulate the model for 500 periods, discard the …rst 100 ob-
servations, and then log and …lter the series consisting of 400 observations. We repeat this
procedure 100 times and compute averages for the 100 samples. We throw away the …rst 100
observations in each run to minimize the potential e¤ect of initial conditions.
17Note that the statistics reported in Table 2 are not reported in Mortensen and Pissarides’ Table II. First,
our statistics are shown for the levels of job creation and job destruction, whereas their statistics are shown
for the rates. Second, our statistics are shown for data that has been logged and …ltered. In the interest
of space, we have limited ourselves to the statistics shown. We note however, that the conclusions are not
sensitive to whether one focuses on rates rather than levels or on raw data rather than …ltered data. However,
…ltering the data can a¤ect one’s perception of along which dimensions the data and model are most at odds.
18Table 2
Results for Mortensen and Pissarides’ Numerical Example
(filtered data)
2a. Standard Deviations and Autocorrelations
standard deviation autocorrelation
Employment .017 .47
Job Creation .121 .17
Job Destruction .147 -.07
2b. Contemporaneous Correlations
Employment Job Creation Job Destruction
Employment 1.00 -.08 -.81
Job Creation -.08 1.00 -.43
Job Destruction -.81 -.43 1.00
2c. Correlations With Employment at Leads and Lags
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Job Creation -.21 -.46 -.86 -.08 .03 .07 .10
Job Destruction .08 .09 .11 -.81 -.38 -.17 -.07
A comparison of Table 2 with Table 1 is informative. First, note that the model does
account for some qualitative features found in the data. In terms of relative volatilities, both
job creation and job destruction are more volatile than is employment, and job destruction is
more volatile than is job creation. In terms of correlations, job destruction is negatively corre-
lated with employment and job creation, whereas job creation displays very little correlation
with employment. There are, however, some important quantitative discrepancies. First, the
autocorrelations in all three series are far too low relative to the data. Second, creation is
too volatile relative to employment and destruction. Third, the contemporaneous correlation
between employment and destruction is too negative. We note additionally that creation
would appear to be not su¢ciently correlated with future employment, and destruction is
not su¢ciently correlated with lagged employment.
Recall the discussion from the previous section. We argue that one way to obtain
a negative correlation between job creation and job destruction is to have frequent shocks,
which intuitively should translate into a lower autocorrelation in employment. Although the
above simulations do deliver the negative correlation, it seems possible that it is coming at
the expense of matching the autocorrelation in employment.
19As we have stressed, this particular numerical example is not constructed in an attempt
to reproduce the facts in Section 2, nor is it meant as a calibration exercise. Hence, the above
discrepancies do not provide much information on whether some reasonable version of the
Mortensen-Pissarides model can account for the larger set of facts. The issue we turn to
next is whether one can obtain improvement along the dimensions for which the match is
particularly bad without sacri…cing the success achieved along other dimensions. Rather than
searching over structural speci…cations of the MP model, we search over speci…cations of the
reduced form outlined in the previous section. As we argue earlier, we think this approach
o¤ers three advantages: robustness, transparency, and parsimony.
B. Findings From Reduced-Form Analysis
In this subsection, we report our …ndings on the ability of the reduced-form model
parameterized by Á; ¸0; ¸1; ¸2; p1; and p2 to account for the cyclical facts documented in
Section 2. Recall that the reduced-form model is summarized by the following equations:
ut+1 = ¸t+1(1 ¡ ut) + (1 ¡ pt)ut
Ct = pt¡1ut¡1;Dt = ¸t(1 ¡ ut)
pt = pst;¸t = ¸st + Â(st = 2;st¡1 = 1)¸0; (22)
where st is the aggregate shock in period t, and Â(st = 2;st¡1 = 1) is an indicator function
which takes on the value 1 if st = 2 and st¡1 = 1 and 0 otherwise.
There are six parameters that need to be speci…ed. Looking ahead to our results, we
will …nd it convenient to think in terms of the average values for p and ¸ and the magnitude
of ‡uctuations in each series. This leads us to consider an alternative parameterization in
which ^ p and ^ ¸ are de…ned as the means for the pj’s and ¸j’s, respectively, and ¾p and ¾¸
are de…ned as the percent deviations in p and ¸; respectively, from their average values. The
four parameters pj and ¸j; j = 1;2 are given by
p1 = (1 + ¾p)^ p; p2 = ^ p=(1 + ¾p)
¸1 = ^ ¸=(1 + ¾¸); ¸2 = ^ ¸(1 + ¾¸): (23)
20The values ^ p and ^ ¸ can be interpreted as describing long-run or average properties,
whereas Á; ¸0; ¾p; and ¾¸ can be interpreted as describing the cyclical properties.18 In
particular, it is easy to see that ^ p determines the average duration of an unemployment spell
(the average duration is equal to the inverse of ^ p); whereas ^ ¸ is the average job destruction
rate. Recall from our earlier analysis that an economy with p always equal to ^ p and ¸ always
equal to ^ ¸ would have steady-state unemployment given by
^ u =
^ ¸
^ p + ^ ¸
: (24)
One of our …ndings is that the extent to which this model can account for the business
cycle facts depends critically on the average values about which the economy ‡uctuates. We
emphasize that these average values are simply a device used to organize our …ndings; in our
model, the economy is never in a state in which p equals ^ p or ¸ equals ^ ¸:
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We choose values for ^ p and ^ ¸ according to some
criterion and then investigate the extent to which the speci…cation can account for the cyclical
facts for some choice of Á;¸0; ¾p; and ¾¸: There is no presumption that this model can or
should account for all the facts; our interest is in assessing the extent to which it can capture
a substantial fraction of what we …nd in the data.
Initially, we adopt a rather weak de…nition of what constitutes success. We look at
four dimensions: variability of employment, autocorrelation of employment, relative variabil-
ity of job creation and job destruction, and the contemporaneous correlation between job
creation and job destruction. Our cuto¤ for success is that the model simultaneously ac-
counts for at least half of observed employment variability (but no more than 1:2 times the
actual variability), predicts an autocorrelation for employment of at least .8, predicts that job
destruction is at least as variable as job creation, and predicts a negative contemporaneous
correlation between job creation and job destruction. These are very weak conditions¡even if
they were all to be satis…ed, it is not clear that one would necessarily claim to quantitatively
account for the business cycle facts. However, our …rst result will be negative, namely, that
for the steady-state speci…cation used in the Mortensen-Pissarides numerical example, there
18The values ^ p and ^ ¸ are not true means of the series for p and ¸: They are simply a useful device to
organize the parameterization.
21is no speci…cation of our reduced form which can simultaneously satisfy these criterion. This
negative …nding is, of course, strengthened by our use of a very weak criterion.
Results Using MP Steady-State Values
We begin with a speci…cation in which ^ ¸ equals :055 and ^ p equals :6. The choice of ^ ¸ is
motivated by the fact that in the Davis-Haltiwanger-Schuh data, the sample average for the
quarterly job destruction rate is 5:5 percent. The choice for ^ p implies an average duration of
(completed) unemployment spells equal to 1:67 quarters or roughly 21 weeks. In conjunction
with the choice of ^ ¸; it implies an average unemployment rate of 8:4 percent. These last two
…gures seem reasonable and basically correspond to the averages used in the simulations of
the Mortensen and Pissarides model reported earlier.
We proceed by searching over combinations of Á; ¸0; ¾p; and ¾¸: For each set of values
for these parameters, we simulate the employment dynamics for a run of 500 quarters and
compute the sample statistics described above to determine whether the given set of values
generates a successful match.
In view of the very weak criterion used to gauge success, our …nding is rather striking:
we …nd no parameter values which generate a match. To provide a sense of where the
di¢culties arise, we present a subset of the relevant summary statistics for one choice of
parameters: Á = :95; and ¸0 = :02: Although the statistics presented below are not the




(filtered data; Á = :95; ¸0 = :02; ^ p = :6; ^ ¸ = :055)
3a. corr(Ct;Dt)
¾¸n¾p .2 .4 .6 .8
.2 .11 -.14 -.23 -.25
.4 .34 .12 -.02 -.08
.6 .42 .25 .13 .07
.8 .46 .33 .22 .16
3b. sd(D)=sd(C)
¾¸n¾p .2 .4 .6 .8
.2 1.33 .91 .66 .49
.4 1.29 1.13 .93 .72
.6 1.26 1.19 1.04 .82
.8 1.25 1.20 1.09 .86
3c. sd(E)
¾¸n¾p .2 .4 .6 .8
.2 .016 .022 .029 .035
.4 .023 .030 .036 .043
.6 .029 .036 .043 .050
.8 .035 .043 .050 .058
3d. corr(Et;Et¡1)
¾¸n¾p .2 .4 .6 .8
.2 .86 .86 .83 .79
.4 .86 .86 .85 .82
.6 .85 .86 .85 .83
.8 .85 .86 .85 .83
3e. E¤ects of Á and ¸0 on Summary Statistics
¾¸=:2; ¾p = :2; ¸0 = :02 ¾¸=:2; ¾p = :2; Á = :95
Á = :9 Á = :8 Á = :7 ¸0 = 0 ¸0 = :04 ¸0 = :08
sd(D)=sd(C) 1.38 1.52 1.59 1.04 1.50 1.56
corr(D;C) .01 -.21 -.16 .08 .09 .01
corr(Et¡1;Et) .82 .70 .66 .88 .79 .62
Not surprisingly, Table 3b indicates that to match sd(D)=sd(C) we basically need
to be on or below the diagonal. However, to obtain a negative correlation between C and
D, Table 3a indicates that we need to be above the diagonal. This illustrates the tension
pointed out in Section 4. Although the correlation between C and D can be decreased
by increasing the ratio of ¾p to ¾d; this improvement along one dimension does not come
without negative consequences along other dimensions. There are a few other remarks that
are worthy of mention, some of which relate to information not provided above but which
are fairly intuitive. The acceptable region in Table 3b can be expanded by increasing the
size of ¸0: This creates a problem, however, since as ¸0 increases, the persistence in each of
the three series decreases, due to the fact that a lot of the variance is attributed to these
one-time spikes in destruction. Similarly, as remarked earlier, the acceptable region in Table
3a can be increased by making the shocks more frequent, i.e., decreasing Á: This also has the
problem of decreasing the persistence in each of the three series.
23On the basis of our analysis, we conclude that for this steady-state parameterization,
the MP model cannot account for the business cycle facts on employment, job creation,
and job destruction. This leaves open the question as to whether there are other steady-
state parameterizations for which this result does not hold. As discussed in Section 4, there
is reason to believe that alternative steady-state speci…cations may lead to more positive
results. We turn to this issue next, postponing until later a discussion of what constitute
acceptable steady-state con…gurations.
Results for Alternative Steady-State Con…gurations
As discussed earlier, higher average values of ¸+p imply faster convergence following
shocks. Hence, lower values of this sum will possibly expand the acceptable region in Table
3. We …nd that a change in the average value of p can bring about a substantial improvement
in the degree to which the model’s predictions match the facts documented in Section 2. To
illustrate this …nding, Table 4 presents the results analogous to those in Table 3, but for the
case in which Á = :85; ¸0 = :02; ^ p = :33; and ^ ¸ = :055: A few remarks are in order. First, the
implied average unemployment rate ^ u is equal to .14. Second, a lower value of Á is used in
Table 4 than in Table 3, because the lower value of ^ p allows the model to generate su¢cient
persistence even with a lower value of Á: As seen in Table 4, this speci…cation yields as much
autocorrelation in employment as does the previous speci…cation. Lastly, the range of values
considered for ¾p and ¾¸ is smaller in Table 4 than it was in Table 3 since, with a smaller
value of ^ p; the model predicts greater volatility in employment holding all else constant. The
cases reported in Table 4 generate roughly the same volatility for employment as do the cases
reported in Table 3.
Table 4
Model Predictions
(filtered data; Á = :85; ¸0 = :02; ^ p = :33; ^ ¸ = :055)
244a. corr(Ct;Dt)
¾¸n¾p .10 .15 .20 .25
.10 -.24 -.29 -.30 -.30
.15 -.19 -.29 -.33 -.36
.20 -.12 -.24 -.32 -.36
.25 -.06 -.19 -.28 -.34
4b. sd(D)=sd(C)
¾¸n¾p .10 .15 .20 .25
.10 2.08 1.52 1.15 .93
.15 2.08 1.70 1.36 1.12
.20 2.04 1.80 1.52 1.29
.25 1.98 1.84 1.62 1.42
4c. sd(E)
¾¸n¾p .10 .15 .20 .25
.10 .0147 .0173 .0200 .0225
.15 .0178 .0205 .0231 .0257
.20 .0208 .0235 .0262 .0287
.25 .0238 .0265 .0291 .0317
4d. corr(Et;Et¡1)
¾¸n¾p .10 .15 .20 .25
.10 .83 .85 .86 .86
.15 .84 .85 .86 .86
.20 .84 .85 .86 .86
.25 .84 .85 .86 .86
Although the basic pattern is not much di¤erent than in Table 3, a signi…cant di¤erence
is that the acceptable regions are now much larger, and in particular, there are settings which
satisfy all of the (weak) criteria imposed earlier. To provide more detail for a particular




(filtered data; Á = :85; ¸0 = :02; ^ p = :33; ^ ¸ = :055; ¾p = :25; ¾¸ = :25)
5a. Standard Deviations and Autocorrelations
standard deviation autocorrelation
Employment .032 .86
Job Creation .137 .58
Job Destruction .194 .36
5b. Contemporaneous Correlations
Employment Job Creation Job Destruction
Employment 1.00 -.14 -.48
Job Creation -.14 1.00 -.34
Job Destruction -.48 -.34 1.00
5c. Correlations With Employment at Leads and Lags
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Job Creation -.81 -.83 -.53 -.14 .03 .07 .29
Job Destruction .30 .19 -.02 -.48 -.71 -.69 -.52
While a comparison of Tables 5 and 2 with Table 1 reveals substantial improvement
along several dimensions, it is still the case that this particular example misses along some
dimensions. In particular, several of the correlations of job creation and job destruction with
leads and lags of employment seem too small in absolute value, and the autocorrelation in
destruction seems a bit low. Further reduction in the average value of p brings additional
improvement, however. The next two tables repeat the above exercise with ^ p = :25: This
implies an average unemployment rate of roughly .18.
26Table 6
Model Predictions
(filtered data; Á = :80; ¸0 = :01; ^ p = :25; ^ ¸ = :055)
6a. corr(Ct;Dt)
¾¸n¾p .10 .15 .20 .25
.10 -.36 -.34 -.33 -.33
.15 -.40 -.41 -.40 -.40
.20 -.38 -.43 -.44 -.44
.25 -.35 -.42 -.44 -.45
6b. sd(D)=sd(C)
¾¸n¾p .10 .15 .20 .25
.10 1.64 1.10 .83 .67
.15 2.03 1.42 1.09 .88
.20 2.30 1.71 1.33 1.09
.25 2.45 1.94 1.55 1.28
6c. sd(E)
¾¸n¾p .10 .15 .20 .25
.10 .0140 .0170 .0201 .0230
.15 .0173 .0203 .0233 .0263
.20 .0205 .0235 .0265 .0295
.25 .0236 .0266 .0296 .0326
6d. corr(Et;Et¡1)
¾¸n¾p .10 .15 .20 .25
.10 .83 .85 .85 .85
.15 .83 .85 .85 .85
.20 .83 .84 .85 .85
.25 .83 .84 .85 .85
Table 7
Model Predictions
(filtered data; Á = :80; ¸0 = :01; ^ p = :25; ^ ¸ = :055; ¾p = :20; ¾¸ = :25)
7a. Standard Deviations and Autocorrelations
standard deviation autocorrelation
Employment .030 .85
Job Creation .128 .46
Job Destruction .198 .33
7b. Contemporaneous Correlations
Employment Job Creation Job Destruction
Employment 1.00 .04 -.37
Job Creation .04 1.00 -.44
Job Destruction -.37 -.44 1.00
7c. Correlations With Employment at Leads and Lags
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Job Creation -.74 -.77 -.38 .04 .24 .28 .25
Job Destruction .33 .32 .13 -.37 -.66 -.62 -.42
Based on a comparison of Table 7 with Table 1, our conclusion is that this speci…cation
does account for many of the facts presented in Table 1. Moreover, there seems to be an
27improvement along several dimensions relative to Table 5, with no signi…cant worsening along
any other dimension.
In all of the parameterizations analyzed thus far, we have set ^ ¸ = :055; which is the
average quarterly job destruction rate in the data. For reasons we discuss in the next section,
this may be viewed as an upper bound for the job destruction rate in the model. To investigate
the signi…cance of this choice, we have analyzed our reduced-form model using other values
of ^ ¸; ranging from .02 to .055. Our …ndings were very similar, so we do not report the results
in any detail. One statistic which is a¤ected by decreasing ^ ¸ is the magnitude of employment
‡uctuations. This is not surprising, since a decrease in ^ ¸ holding the percent deviations in
job destruction constant will obviously yield smaller percent ‡uctuations in employment.
We close this section with one …nal comment related to the di¤erence between the …rst
model described in Section 3 and the Mortensen-Pissarides model, in which job destruction
is determined endogenously. An important result from the Mortensen-Pissarides analysis is
that once job destruction is endogenized, theory predicts an additional e¤ect, namely, the
asymmetry in the job destruction rate induced by negative aggregate shocks. Although our
analysis does not permit us to make de…nitive statements on the issue, our results do suggest
that the ability of the model to match the business cycle facts is enhanced by having ¸0 be
positive.
6. Discussion
The key …nding fromthe previous section is that the model can account for the business
cycle facts reasonably well if ^ p; the average unemployment hazard, is around .33 or lower. A
value of ^ p this low, however, implies unemployment durations of roughly 39 weeks. According
to data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average duration of unemployment
spells in manufacturing for the period 1972-1988 is around 20 weeks. This might suggest that
our main …nding is negative: for reasonable parameter values, our reduced-form Mortensen-
Pissarides model cannot match the business cycle facts in Section 2.
Here we argue the opposite. There are two important issues to consider.19 The …rst is
19A third issue is that whereas the model is a general equilibrium model, we are using it to match data
from a single sector. While we view this is a caveat, we do not pursue its potential signi…cance here.
28that some care must be taken when using data from the world in which there are three labor
market states (i.e., employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force) to calibrate a model in
which there are only two states (i.e., employed and unemployed). There would be no issue if
transitions between nonparticipation and the other two states were rare, but the data reveal
that this is not the case. For example, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) report that the ‡ow
of workers from out of the labor force into employment is roughly the same as the ‡ow of
workers from unemployment into employment. They also report that the number of workers
categorized as out of the labor force but who want a job is roughly equal in magnitude to
the number of people in the unemployed state.
These last two facts suggest that it is reasonable to consider some individuals from the
out-of-the-labor-market state as individuals who are possibly searching for employment at a
low level of intensity. This is signi…cant for the calibration of the steady state of a matching
model in which searching workers are assumed to be identical, since the representative search-
ing worker in the model must represent both those unemployed workers who are searching
relatively intensely as well as those nonparticipating workers who may be searching less in-
tensely. The key for our calibration exercise is that this interpretation suggests a higher ratio
of individuals searching in the steady state relative to those who are employed and hence
holding the average value of ¸ constant yields a lower probability of moving from nonem-
ployment to employment. In fact, if one follows Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and counts
all nonparticipating individuals who say they want a job as searchers, then in the model’s
steady state, the fraction of people searching should be roughly twice that of the measured
unemployment rate. Taking the reported average unemployment rate in manufacturing of
8.5 percent at face value, this suggests that the speci…cation in Tables 5 and 7 is preferable
to that in Table 2.
To pursue this issue further, it is instructive to examine some relationships which must
hold in steady state. The steady state of the model is characterized by three numbers: the
rate at which employed workers leave employment (¸), the rate at which nonemployed workers
…nd employment (p), and the fraction of workers that are employed (1 ¡ u). It is important
to note, however, that only two of these values are independent, since they are linked by
the relationship u = ¸=(p + ¸): Taking ¸ as given, therefore, there is a one-to-one mapping
29between choices of u and choices of p: Table 8 indicates several possible combinations for
steady-state values of u and p for two values of ¸; .055 and .030.20
20We consider valuess of ¸ less than .055, since one may argue that the …gure of .055 is upward biased for
our purposes by the inclusion of some temporary layo¤s. Some evidence on this is provided later in the paper.
30Table 8
SS u ¡ p Combinations
¸ = :055
p .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
u .22 .15 .12 .10 .08 .07 .06
¸ = :030
p .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
u .13 .09 .07 .06 .05 .04 .04
As Table 8 makes clear, one cannot simultaneously have the fraction of employed
workers equal to .85 and an unemployment hazard of .6. If one takes the stand that the size
of the searching population is 15 percent or higher, a value of p less than .3 is required, even
with ¸ set to .055.
An important quali…cation should be noted. The model studied here is not intended
to capture all of the labor market ‡ows in the real world. In particular, the nature of
worker-…rm separations in the model is such that the employment position ceases to exist;
i.e., it is not …lled by a new worker. Hence, it seems natural to interpret the model as
abstracting from both temporary layo¤s and quits. This is important for two reasons. First,
it suggests that the relevant unemployment rate is probably smaller than suggested above.
However, since published data on unemployment rates by reason for unemployment indicate
that persons on temporary layo¤ or who left their previous job account for roughly 1.5
percentage points of economywide unemployment, this factor is probably not very signi…cant.
Second, unemployment durations are much lower on average for these two groups than they
are for other groups in the population, hence, further suggesting that the relevant duration
of unemployment is higher than published sources indicate.
The above argument has implicitly treated p as a residual to be determined as the value
consistent with speci…ed values of u and ¸. The spirit of the argument, however, is intimately
related to a literature that studies unemployment durations directly and argues that measured
unemployment spells are signi…cantly downwardly biased because of reporting errors induced
by the presence of the out-of-the-labor-force state. (See Clark and Summers (1979) for a
discussion of this phenomenon.) The basic issue is that measured unemployment durations
do not measure the expected time between employment spells, but rather the expected time
31before leaving the unemployment state to either employment or out of the labor force. In
our model, on the other hand, p is probably best interpreted as re‡ecting the (inverse) of the
duration of a nonemployment spell rather than of an unemployment spell. This reasoning also
suggests, therefore, that choosing a value for p based on matching reported unemployment
durations is not necessarily a good strategy for assessing the model’s implications.
The next issue we take up in this section is to pursue the distinction between temporary
and permanent separations somewhat further. As already mentioned, the model studied in
this paper assumes that all separations are permanent, in the sense that all additions to
employment result from a process in which all searching workers have the same probability
of being matched with a given vacancy. In reality, some fraction of employment additions are
accounted for by workers who have been on temporary layo¤ and are being recalled to their
prior positions. If the business cycle facts presented in Section 2 are dominated by a process
of temporary layo¤s and recalls, then our modelling strategy re‡ects a very poor choice.
Unfortunately, the job creation and job destruction data cannot be decomposed into
permanent and temporary components, since they cannot tell if a job added to payroll today
corresponds to a given worker who was previously on payroll. However, one way to gauge
the importance of temporary separations is to consider job creation and job destruction rates
for longer horizons than one quarter. This method has been used by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). They conclude that temporary separations
do not account for the bulk of job reallocation measured with this data.
The procedure used to reach this conclusion is the following. Consider a given estab-
lishment for which the number of payroll positions declines between two consecutive interview
dates. These deleted positions show up as job destruction according to our de…nitions. One
can check, however, whether the number of payroll positions increases at subsequent inter-
view dates. By checking this at various horizons, one may attempt to exclude those cases
of payroll deletions which are reversed soon thereafter. In particular, there may be some
presumption that if a given establishment destroys positions in one period and then creates
positions in the next period, this may re‡ect temporary layo¤s and recalls. Of course, it may
not, but this seems a useful way to bound how much of the activity may be due to temporary
layo¤s.
32This leads us to examine the properties of job creation and job destruction that result
from requiring that the deletions or additions persist for some speci…ed horizon. We have
constructed these series using horizons of zero, one, two, four and eight quarters. Zero
corresponds to the measures used in Section 2. Table 9 displays summary statistics for each
of the series on job creation and job destruction that result. These data have not been
seasonally adjusted.
33Table 9
Summary Statistics for Creation and Destruction at Various Horizons 1972:2-1988:4
(data are filtered but not seasonally adjusted)
sd(D)=sd(C) corr(Ct;Dt) corr(Ct;Ct¡1) corr(Dt;Dt¡1) mean(CR) mean(DR)
0 1.76 -.61 .30 .45 .053 .056
1 1.86 -.21 .45 .38 .039 .043
2 1.50 -.18 .51 .42 .031 .036
4 1.40 -.27 .65 .48 .022 .028
8 1.30 -.25 .68 .45 .018 .024
Although the table shows data for several horizons, from the perspective of temporary
layo¤s, it would seem that the most relevant horizon is one quarter, so we focus our discussion
accordingly on the …rst two rows of the table. As the table indicates, the mean of job creation
and job destruction decrease by about 25 percent in this case, supporting the earlier claim
that the bulk of the activity corresponds to permanent separations. It is also instructive to
examine how the stylized facts change if one looks at these alternative series for creation and
destruction. The …rst four columns of the table show that the stylized facts do not change
very much qualitatively, but that there are some di¤erences quantitatively. For example, the
correlation between job creation and job destruction is somewhat lower in absolute value,
and the autocorrelation of job destruction is lower.
We close this section with a brief discussion of some related papers. There are two
recent papers, Andolfatto (1996) and Merz(1996), that imbed matching models into otherwise
standard real business cycle models and explore the business cycle implications quantitatively.
Andolfatto shows that his model performs about the same as a standard real business cycle
model on the dimensions commonly addressed and that it also matches on some dimensions
such as the unemployment rate-vacancy rate correlation from which the standard model
abstracts. However, although hedoes not explore theimplicationsof hismodel for job creation
and job destruction, it is clear that his model does not match some of the key empirical
regularities. For example, in his model, the job destruction rate is constant, implying that
employment and job destruction would have the same volatility in percentage terms.
Merz, however, speci…cally examines the ‡ows into and out of unemployment and
…nds that her model successfully accounts for the facts. Moreover, in sharp contrast to our
34…ndings, this happens when the average unemployment duration is set to 12 weeks. The
apparent discrepancy between the two papers is resolved by noting that they study di¤erent
objects. Merz’s empirical work studies economywide ‡ows into and out of unemployment,
whereas our empirical work studies job creation and job destruction ‡ows in manufacturing.
In both theoretical models, job creation is identical to the out‡ow from unemployment, and
job destruction is identical to the in‡ow to unemployment. Hence, since Merz …nds a positive
correlation between the in‡ow and out‡ow, she obviously does not account for the negative
correlation between job creation and job destruction. Likewise, since our reduced-form model
accounts for the negative correlation between job creation and job destruction, it does not ac-
count for the positive correlation between the ‡ows into and out of unemployment. However,
in the actual data, there is not such a close association between the various measures, which
explains why it is possible that job creation and job destruction are negatively correlated,
whereas the ‡ows into and out of unemployment are positively correlated.21
To understand the discrepancy in the real data, note that Merz measures the monthly
‡ow into unemployment as a constant times the number of individuals unemployed for less
than …ve weeks. There are several reasons why this may not correspond to job destruction.
First, if an individual enters unemployment from out of the labor force, then there is an
in‡ow into unemployment, but no job has been destroyed. Similarly, if an individual is laid
o¤ and leaves the labor force, then there is no ‡ow into unemployment, but there has been a
job destroyed. Or, if one individual quits a job and becomes unemployed and the …rm hires a
replacement, there is again a discrepancy. The bottom line here is that Merz’s empirical work
focuses on series that are potentially quite di¤erent than the job creation and job destruction
series. A relevant question is for which of the two data sets is the model most appropriate?
In our view, given that both models abstract from quits and transitions between unemployed
and out of the labor force, it is best to focus on the model’s implications for job creation
and job destruction. At a minimum, the discussion suggests that it may be worthwhile to
incorporate these other features into the model.
21Given the di¤erences in time periods and coverage for the two empirical analyses, there are other ex-
planations for the two …ndings. However, work with manufacturing turnover data for a longer time period
suggests that the time horizon is not the determining factor.
35Lastly, one feature of the data that we have not discussed is the presence of counter-
cyclical loops in the dynamics of unemployment and job vacancies. Pissarides (1987) discusses
this feature and shows essentially that the model of this paper does not produce this feature
of the data. He also suggests one possible remedy which e¤ectively introduces some rigidity
in the response of wages to temporary shocks. We leave an integration of this element into
the analysis for future work.
7. Conclusion
The objective of this paper has been to determine to what extent the Mortensen-
Pissarides matching model can account for the business cycle facts on employment, job
creation, and job destruction. A novel feature of our analysis has been its focus on the
reduced-form implications of the model rather than on the structural speci…cation of the
model, since we believe that this facilitates an understanding of the model’s mechanics and
provides a more robust assessment of the model’s empirical implications. Our main …nding
is that the reduced-form structure implied by the model can account for most of the features
found in the data, although this requires that average unemployment durations in the model
be substantially larger than those reported in the data. While we have argued that these
unemployment durations are not implausible, our argument also suggests that it is important
to extend the model in order to better gauge its ability to account for the patterns in the
data. In particular, incorporating heterogeneity in search intensity across workers at a point
in time as well as allowing for quits and temporary separations seem to be important avenues
to pursue. It is also of interest to examine what speci…cations of structural models give rise
to the reduced forms that seem to account for the data, since Caballero and Hammour (1996)
argue analytically in a similar but di¤erent model that departures from e¢ciency may be key
to accounting for the empirical regularities in job creation and job destruction.
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Time Periods: Transition in Period 1
Figure 1
Dynamics of Job Creation and Job Destruction
JD
JC
Mean level of JD and JC